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Lately, more and more authors have asserted their belief that one of the criteria which, together 
with the medical ones, can and should be applied in the policy of selecting and/or prioritizing the 
patients in need for the allocation of medical resources with limited availability, is the principle 
of individual responsibility for illness. My intention in this study is to highlight some very serious 
obstacles looming against the attempt to apply this principle in the distribution of the medical 
services with limited availability. Although there are numerous such obstacles, I shall only 
discuss five of them (the most important, in my opinion). These are: 1) the impossibility to 
establish with certainty whether a patient got ill due to his lifestyle; 2) the lack of a feasible and 
reliable method of establishing an individual’s responsibility for his lifestyle; 3) a patient’s right 
to privacy; 4) some moral requirements and principles and, last but not least, 5) the ethics of the 
medical profession. 
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1. The Issue of Rationing Medical 
Resources with Limited 
Availability and the Principle 
of Individual Responsibility  
for Illness 
Medical resources – especially the 
very expensive ones or those such as 
transplant organs – are often available in 
a limited and insufficient supply. For this 
reason, doctors cannot distribute them to 
all the patients who need them, at least 
not at a time. Such situations, 
unfortunately rather frequent in the 
medical practice virtually everywhere, 
raise a question ever more often 
discussed in the literature of bioethics 
and medical ethics: what principles, 
criteria, and procedures can be applied 
legitimately in the policy of selecting 
and/or prioritizing the patients awaiting 
the allocation of medical resources with 
limited availability? 
This is an extremely difficult and 
vexing matter, one that most of us would 
rather not encounter. This is because the 
criteria applied in the process of selection 
and prioritization of the allocation of 
medical resources with limited 
availability are very often criteria for 
deciding who will live and who will die. 
The medical resources with limited 
availability often represent, to the 
patients who await them, the only chance 
to live. The decision to refuse a person 
who needs such a resource or to give 
him/her low priority may mean, 
therefore, as it often does, a sentence to 
death.  
Lately, more and more authors have 
asserted their belief that one of the 
principles which, together with the 
medical ones, can and should be applied 
while making such would-be tragic 
choices, is individual responsibility for 
illness. The authors I am considering 
include David Brudney, Frank Dietrich, 
Walter Glannon, Eike-Henner Kluge, 
Julian Le Grand, Alvin H. Moss and 
Mark Siegler, Eric Rakowski, Re'em 
Segev, Barry Smart, or Robert Veatch 
[1]. According to this principle, the 
people who got ill with no fault of their 
own deserve or are entitled, more than 
those who are (demonstrated with 
certainty to be) responsible for causing 
the disease they suffer from, to be 
allocated the medical resources with 
limited availability. The people 
responsible for causing their own disease 
are, essentially, those who got ill as a 
consequence of a behaviour or lifestyle 
for which they are morally to blame in a 
legitimate manner. The principle 
recommends, therefore, that these people 
be given low priority in the distribution 
of medical resources with limited 
availability when they compete against 
other people who got ill with no fault of 
their own. My first and foremost 
intention in what follows is to highlight 
some quite notable obstacles looming 
against our attempt to apply the principle 
of individual responsibility for illness in 
the distribution of medical services with 
limited availability. Although there are 
numerous such obstacles, I shall only 
discuss five of them (the most important, 
in my opinion). These are: 1) the 
impossibility to establish with certainty 
whether a patient got ill due to his/her 
lifestyle; 2) the lack of a feasible and 
reliable method of establishing an 
individual’s responsibility for his/her 
lifestyle; 3) the patient’s right to privacy; 
4) some moral requirements and 
principles and, last but not least, 5) the 
ethics of the medical profession. 
The thesis sustaining the existence of 
these obstacles is a controversial one. For 
example, some supporters of the 
principle of individual responsibility for 
illness have argued that at least some 
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obstacles are not universal, i.e. they do 
not occur with all categories of patients 
eligible for an assessment of their equal 
entitlement to a medical service with 
limited availability based on this 
principle. To be more precise, these 
obstacles do not occur in the policy of 
implementation, too, of the principle of 
individual responsibility for illness in the 
distribution of liver transplant (where 
most candidates are alcoholics). As a 
matter of fact, most of the advocates of 
the principle of individual responsibility 
for illness do not actually plead for its 
universal implementation, but only for its 
implementation in the case of alcoholics 
who require a liver transplant. Some of 
these authors, such as Frank Dietrich, 
even admit that the universal 
implementation of this principle is both 
non-feasible and unacceptable, due to 
some obstacles like those which will be 
discussed further. However, in Dietrich's 
opinion, the application of the principle 
exclusively for alcoholics remains not 
only possible, but also legitimate. 
Are these authors right? Is their 
position supported by sound arguments? 
Is it a fact that most of the impediments 
of implementing the principle of 
individual responsibility for illness are 
merely partial and incidental? Can this 
principle be applied fully only in the case 
of alcoholics? My hope is that these 
questions will be answered adequately in 
the conclusions of this study. Before that 
point, though, I will go on to discuss and 










2. A Few Considerations and  
Arguments on the Obstacles  
of Using the Principle  
of Individual Responsibility  
for Illness 
2.1 The impossibility to establish  
with certainty whether  
a patient got ill  
due to his/her lifestyle  
A sine qua non condition for the 
principle of individual responsibility for 
illness to be applied in the policy of 
rationing the medical services is that 
doctors – or other experts – are able to 
establish with certainty that a patient who 
applies for medical resources with 
limited availability is responsible (i.e., 
legitimately accountable from a moral 
point of view) beyond any doubt of 
inflicting upon him/herself the disease 
that require such resources. In order to 
reach a clear verdict regarding the degree 
of a patient’s accountability for his/her 
disease, we must be able, first of all, to 
affirm with certainty that the disease 
he/she suffers from is the result of his/her 
lifestyle (and not of any other factor). 
Sometimes it is very likely that this 
condition is easily met. We can assume 
for sure, for instance, that doctors can 
establish beyond any doubt whether a 
patient got ill or injured as a result of 
practising a more or less extreme sport 
(like skiing or climbing) or following an 
irresponsible sexual behaviour (like in 
the case of patients with HIV). However, 
as even some of the defenders of the 
principle of individual responsibility for 
illness point out, the situation is 
completely different for the bulk of the 
other categories of patients who can be 
suspected of bringing their diseases onto 
themselves: “There are numerous 
possible causes for the majority of other 
diseases, and determining what exactly 
triggered the development of an illness is 
usually impossible. Statistical 
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correlations between consumer behavior 
and the incidence of certain ailments are 
often all that can be ascertained. 
Statistics show, for example, that obese 
individuals have a higher risk of 
suffering a cardiac arrest and that 
smokers are more prone to illnesses of 
the respiratory system than non-smokers. 
But one cannot determine beyond all 
doubt that the respiratory illness of a 
specific patient was caused by his or her 
smoking. The possibility that the patient 
would have become ill even if he or she 
had wholly abstained from smoking 
cannot be excluded” [3]. Even for this 
reason alone, it is virtually impossible 
therefore to apply the principle of 
individual responsibility for illness, at 
least at a large scale. 
Still, as we have shown already, most 
authors who endorse implementing the 
principle of individual responsibility for 
illness argue only in favour of its use for 
illness in the distribution of liver 
transplant. That is, they only endorse the 
possibility of diminishing the right of 
alcoholic patients to apply for such a 
transplant. But the authors I am 
considering here assert that, in the 
particular case of these patients, the 
doctors are able to certify whether 
prolongued alcohol abuse caused the 
liver disease that might justify the 
transplant. 
The adepts of this principle are right 
if their thesis affirms that there are 
patients for whom the doctors can 
establish beyond all doubt that they got 
ill following alcohol abuse. And yet the 
thesis (at least) some of them appear to 
promote is a much stronger one: namely 
that doctors can always establish beyond 
all doubt whether a patient got ill as a 
result of alcohol abuse, only based on his 
symptomatology. Now this thesis is false. 
On its own, symptomatology enables 
doctors to establish at best only that a 
patient suffers from an alcoholic liver 
disease. But the alcoholic liver disease 
and alcoholism are not the same thing. 
To be more exact, moderate consumption 
of alcohol, too, can cause an alcoholic 
disease, as it usually happens with 
women. Besides, the diagnosis of 
alcoholic liver disease established only 
on grounds of symptomatology is not a 
certain one as a rule, since even the most 
reliable procedure of establishing this 
diagnosis, the liver biopsy, is fallible. In 
most instances, the doctors are sure about 
the diagnosis or about the patient’s 
history of alcohol abuse only after they 
have a conversation with him/her or 
consult other relevant sources of 
information about the history of his/her 
lifestyle [4]. 
 
2.2 The lack of a reliable method 
to establish and assess  
the degree of individual  
responsibility for one’s lifestyle 
Establishing beyond any doubt that a 
patient got ill as a result of his/her 
lifestyle is not the only condition to be 
met in order to give a clear verdict on 
his/her accountability for the disease 
he/she suffers from. It is also necessary 
to be able to prove that the patient is 
legitimately accountable from a moral 
point of view for the kind of lifestyle 
which resulted in that disease. 
Some might believe that all the 
people with health-threatening lifestyles 
are legitimately accountable from a 
moral point of view. This is because all 
health-threatening lifestyles including 
those which, at some point, involve 
addiction, too, are in principle, at least 
initially, the result of individual choices. 
Moreover, addiction is not an 
insurmountable state. Many people 
manage to overcome it, whether by 
themselves, or with medical help and 
family support etc. Not lastly, although 
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many a time health-threatening conducts 
or lifestyles are genetically predisposed, 
this fact is not a triggering factor, but it 
merely influences an individual in 
adopting and/or continuing them. 
True as these things may be, they do 
not prove though that all individuals with 
health-threatening lifestyles are 
legitimately accountable from a moral 
point of view. Even if we accept the 
above-mentioned ideas, it remains 
possible that at least some of them have 
very good excuses for choosing or 
persisting [5] in health-threatening 
lifestyles (excuses such as age, poverty, 
social isolation, challenging family 
environment, mental illness, experience 
of profound grief, insufficient education, 
reduced capacity of analysis and 
understanding, cultural background, etc.). 
Blaming these, too, may sometimes mean 
to fall in the trap of ”blaming the 
victims” [6]. What does this mean? It 
means that, in order to be able to apply 
the principle of individual responsibility 
for illness in rationing the medical 
services without being unjust to at least 
some of the patients with health-
threatening lifestyles, we must have a 
feasible and reliable procedure to identify 
those patients who are truly responsible 
(and accountable) for a lifestyle known 
with certainty or assumed, more or less 
plausibly, to represent the cause of the 
illness for which they need the medical 
resources with limited availability. But 
one of the prevailing impediments in 
applying the principle of individual 
responsibility for illness in rationing the 
medical services with limited availability 
is precisely the lack of such a procedure. 
However, this impediment appears to 
have been overcome recently through a 
proposition by John Roemer. In his view, 
doctors or other experts could establish, 
for instance, whether a patient who 
smokes is accountable for the lifestyle 
that resulted in his/her lung cancer, 
and/or to what extent he/she is 
accountable, using a four-step formula. 
Firstly, they should decide what are the 
relevant circumstances in determining or 
influencing the people to adopt this 
unhealthy lifestyle (smoking in our case): 
e. g., the patient’s age, occupation, sex, 
family environment, income, addiction 
etc. These circumstances will represent 
factors beyond the patient’s control (i. e., 
factors for which he/she cannot be 
legitimately considered responsible). The 
second step consists in the grouping of 
smokers in different types, each type 
including those persons who share 
similar values for all the features found 
in the first step (same age, occupation, 
etc.) One such type could be, for 
instance, 60-year-old male steel-workers, 
or, 60-year-old female teachers. Step 
three is to calculate the average number 
of years in which the members of each 
type are likely to smoke. For example, 
this number might be 30 for the 60-year-
old male steel-workers and 10 for 60-
year-old female teachers. Both the 
patient’s accountability and the degree of 
responsibility (if we find that he/she is 
responsible) are established in the fourth 
stage function of his/her ranking based 
on the average number of years 
calculated in step three within his/her 
type. Let us assume that our patient is a 
60-year-old male steel-worker. If this 
patient has smoked for a number of years 
equal to, or smaller than, the average 
number typical to this type of patients, he 
will be considered not responsible (since 
the average typical to his category or to 
other categories is determined by 
circumstantial factors which are out of 
the direct individual control). In other 
words, the patient will be legitimately 
considered responsible only if he has 
smoked for more years than the average 
within his type (in our case here, for 
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more than 30 years). Also, the degree of 
his responsibility will be established 
depending on the extra number of years 
of smoking above the average number for 
his type. If our patient has only smoked 
for 31 years, then he has a very low 
degree of accountability. But if, on the 
other hand, he has smoked for 40 years, 
then we can legitimately believe that he 
is responsible to a high or very high 
degree [7]. 
As we can see, the Roemerian 
formula assesses the individual 
responsibility for one’s lifestyle 
according to its typicality or atypicality. 
The more similar an individual’s lifestyle 
is to the social type, the less accountable 
he is. And the more his lifestyle diverges 
from his social type, the more 
accountable he is. 
Admittedly, this formula is very 
ingenious. Yet, is it reliable, too? There 
are several arguments which prove the 
idea that it isn't [8]. But I shall limit 
myself here to bringing only Norman 
Daniels’s argument (which is also one of 
the most powerful). As he points out, the 
Roemerian formula “does not capture the 
relevant notion of responsibility. 
Atypicality is a poor measure of effort or 
desert or responsibility. For example, it 
makes responsibility depend largely on 
what others do, not on what we do. In 
any case, we still face this outcome: If 
skiing is a common behavior of the rich 
but not of the poor, then the poor skier is 
more responsible for his broken leg in a 
skiing accident than the rich skier” [9].  
The very feasibility of this formula 
raises some serious questions, too. As we 
can notice, the doctors – or other experts 
at the job – need quite a large amount of 
personal information about patients in 
order to be able to apply the Roemerian 
formula. However, this kind of 
information is not always available, or it 
is not easily accessible. Under such 
circumstances, the process of collecting 
this information may require extremely 
detailed and complex investigations and, 
consequently, rather a long time, which 
doctors, as well as their patients, might 
not really have. Moreover, this process 
might also be very costly [10]. But more 
importantly, the necessary information to 
apply this formula – and, in general, the 
information necessary to prove a 
patient’s accountability for his/her 
lifestyle – come from his/her private life. 
In other words, the price for collecting 
this sort of information – and, 
consequently, for applying the 
Roemerian formula – is very high, at 
least in a democratic and liberal society: 
invading the patients’ privacy. This is, in 
fact, one of the most serious impediments 
in the use of the individual responsibility 
for illness as a principle in rationing the 
medical services. 
 
2.3. The patients’ right  
to privacy 
Is this a universal obstacle against 
applying the principle of individual 
responsibility for illness as a criterion in 
rationing the medical services? No, in 
Frank Dietrich’s opinion, a defender of 
the principle. In his view, the right to 
privacy does not impede the application 
of the principle of individual 
responsibility for illness in the case of 
(alcoholic) patients requesting a liver 
transplant. This is because the doctors are 
able to establish whether a patient is 
responsible for causing the liver disease 
which requires a liver transplant without 
violating his right. Dietrich’s argument in 
supporting this thesis is that “a... feature 
of liver transplantation is the easy 
availability of the relevant information in 
any given case of liver damage. The 
symptoms reliably indicate whether it 
was caused by alcohol abuse or not. 
Furthermore, the doctors in attendance 
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are usually well-acquainted with a 
patient’s case history. There is no need 
for troublesome investigations to find out 
whether the potential recipient of a donor 
liver is an alcoholic” [11]. 
As we have seen, at least one of the 
premises of this argument is false. As a 
matter of fact, the doctors are not able to 
establish with certainty whether a patient 
got ill following alcohol abuse, only by 
relying on his symptomatology. 
Secondly, Dietrich’s considerations are 
not enough to legitimize the thesis 
thereof, that the doctors are able to 
establish whether a patient is responsible 
for causing his alcoholic liver disease 
without breaking his/her right to privacy. 
In order for this thesis to be valid, it is 
not enough that doctors be able to 
determine precisely whether a patient got 
ill as a result of alcohol abuse without 
having to conduct “troublesome 
investigations”. The doctors might also 
need to be able to evaluate whether the 
patient is legitimately accountable – that 
is, whether he/she has an acceptable 
excuse – for the fact that he/she was an 
alcoholic without resorting to such 
inquiries. And this is impossible, for 
reasons such as those presented above. 
Consequently, the thesis that the right to 
privacy does not represent an 
impediment to applying the principle of 
individual responsibility for illness in the 
distribution of the liver transplant is 
false. 
 
2.4. A few moral requirements 
and principles 
Let us assume that Dietrich’s 
argument is acceptable. Does this mean 
that it is just that the principle of 
individual responsibility for illness be 
applied for alcoholics exclusively, as he 
believes, along with other authors who 
support this principle? I believe it is not. 
Applying this principle only partially is, 
in my opinion, as in other authors’ view 
[12], illegitimate. I consider that it would 
be discriminatory and, consequently, 
unfair. Justice requires that if, for various 
reasons, this principle cannot be applied 
to all patients accountable for their 
illness, then it must not be applied at all. 
Otherwise, the subjects of this principle 
would be unjustly discriminated since 
they would be the only patients punished 
for a liability that might be shared by 
other categories of patients as well. This 
requirement of justice is not the only 
moral requirement standing against the 
application of the principle of individual 
responsibility for illness in rationing the 
medical services. Another requirement of 
this sort is the principle of (equal) respect 
for everyone’s human dignity. This 
principle forbids humiliating or 
demeaning treatment. But there are 
serious reasons to doubt the compatibility 
between this principle and the way the 
patients are assessed as to their 
entitlement to the medical services with 
limited availability on grounds of their 
responsibility for their illness. A patient 
liable to be tested on his accountability 
for the disease he/she suffers from, 
and/or be ranked on the waiting list for a 
transplant on grounds of morality, would 
feel humiliated. In other words, these 
practices would constitute a serious 
offence to his/her dignity [13]. Moreover, 
the implementation of such practices 
would mark the settlement of moralism 
in the rationing of the medical services 
[14], which is unacceptable. John Harris 
explains very aptly why in the following 
remark: “We all, of course, have a duty 
to encourage and promote morality, but 
to do so by choosing between candidates 
for treatment on moral grounds is to 
arrogate to ourselves not simply the 
promotion of morality but the 
punishment of immorality. And to choose 
to let one person rather than another die 
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on the grounds of some moral defect in 
their behaviour or character is to take 
upon ourselves the right not simply to 
punish, but capitally to punish, offenders 
against morality. Even in the... event of 
our being satisfied that we were entitled 
or obliged to do this we would be 
attempting to discharge a quasi-judicial 
function without any of the safeguards or 
rigour of legal proceedings” [15]. 
 
2.5. The ethics of  
the medical profession 
As a rule, those who support the use 
of the principle of individual 
responsibility in rationing medical 
services are philosophers. But there are 
also doctors – like Alvin H. Moss and 
Mark Siegler, or Gregory Tetrault – who 
have endorsed this idea [16]. This is 
surprising to me at least, since medical 
ethics does not allow doctors to consider 
this principle of rationing (which has 
been pointed out by their peers) [17]. The 
fundamental values and principles that 
stand at the basis of medical ethics 
include values and principles clearly 
incompatible with applying the principle 
of individual responsibility for illness in 
the rationing of medical services. Such 
values and principles are, for instance, 
compassion or solidarity with the 
suffering person (regardless of his/her 
responsibility for his/her own illness), 
professional secret or the principle of 
beneficence (a principle of Hippocratic 
origin which urges doctors to act only in 
their patients’ interest, to be their 
patients’ unconditional advocates – and 
not judges, and to refrain from using the 
information they have about their 
patients for purposes other than adequate 
medical care). One of the primordial 
reasons which legitimate such 
professional obligations is the necessity 
of a relationship of trust between the 
patient and the doctor. As it has been 
remarked [18], in the absence of such a 
relationship, the supreme aim of the 
medical act, the patient’s health, could no 
longer be met. But the introduction of the 
principle of individual responsibility for 
illness in rationing the medical services 
would result precisely in the break of the 
doctor-patient relationship, at least in the 
case of patients with health-threatening 
lifestyles. Knowing that, one day, the 
doctors might use the personal 
information against their interests, these 
patients will understandably be cautious 
– if not even deceitful – in providing 
private data, which would jeopardize 
their treatment even for diseases for 
which it is generally available (or at least 
for which the treatment is not as 
dramatically limited as is organ 
transplant). 
 
3. Two Final Remarks 
What conclusions can we draw from 
these explanations and arguments on the 
obstacles to implementing the principle 
of individual responsibility for illness in 
the distribution of the medical services 
with limited availability? One of the 
main conclusions is that only the first 
impediment discussed here – the 
impossibility to establish beyond any 
doubt whether a patient got ill as a result 
of his/her lifestyle – is indeed a partial 
obstacle, which occurs only with some 
categories of patients under suspicion of 
causing their own diseases. If the 
arguments invoked in this article are 
correct, all the other obstacles mentioned 
are universal, and they can also occur in 
the case of alcoholic patients who apply 
for a liver transplant. The thesis that the 
obstacles in question do not occur with 
these patients, too, is based on more than 
questionable arguments. 
What are the consequences that result 
from this? We can say that there are no 
convincing reasons behind the thesis that 
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only the idea is unacceptable of the 
universal application of the principle of 
individual responsibility for illness, while 
its application remains legitimate in the 
case of alcoholic patients requiring a 
liver transplant. In fact, the idea of 
applying the principle for these patients 
exclusively is unacceptable as well. The 
explanation is, I think, obvious. This 
principle of individual responsibility for 
illness is applicable only after the 
obstacles we have discussed have been 
removed. But to remove some of them – 
such as the patients’ right to privacy, the 
moral requirements and principles, or the 
medical ethics – is itself unacceptable for 
at least as long as we take them seriously.  
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